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We investigate the use of quantum scissors, as candidates for non-deterministic amplifiers, in continuous-
variable quantum key distribution. Such devices rely on single-photon sources for their operation and as such,
they do not necessarily preserve the Guassianity of the channel. Using exact analytical modeling for the system
components, we bound the secret key generation rate for a protocol that uses quantum scissors. We find that,
for certain non-zero values of excess noise, such a protocol can reach longer distances than the counterpart with
no amplification. This sheds light into the prospect of using quantum scissors as an ingredient in continuous-
variable quantum repeaters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–3] addresses the prob-
lem of sharing secret keys between two users. Such keys
can then be used for secure communications. While original
QKD protocols [2–5] rely on encoding classical bits of in-
formation in discrete quantum states, such as the polarization
of single photons, one can also exploit continuous-variable
QKD (CV QKD) protocols, where the bits are encoded on the
quadratures of light [6–9]. In particular, the recent progress
in CV QKD systems has placed them in a competitive po-
sition with their conventional discrete-variable counterparts
[10, 11]. For instance, contrary to discrete-variable QKD pro-
tocols, which require single-photon detectors, CV QKD uses
coherent measurement schemes, such as homodyne and/or
heterodyne detection, to measure light quadratures, with-
out relying on photon counting devices [12–14]. Moreover,
CV QKD protocols can be the better choice over short dis-
tances than the metropolitan zones [11]. Once it comes to long
distances, however, CV QKD has its own challenges to com-
pete with discrete-variable QKD [15]. This paper examines
how the security distance can be enhanced in CV QKD sys-
tems by using realistic non-deterministic amplification [16].
One of the proposed solutions to improve the rate-versus-
distance performance of CV QKD protocols is to use noiseless
linear amplifiers (NLAs) [16, 17]. It is known that determinis-
tic amplification cannot be noise free [18]. An NLA can only
then work probabilistically. This inevitably reduces the key
rate by a factor corresponding to the success rate of the NLA,
which implies that, at short distances, the use of NLAs may
not be beneficial. The key rate may, however, increase at long
distances because of the improvement in the signal to noise
ratio. That is, while the number of data points we can use for
key extraction is less, the quality of the remaining points could
be also high, such that a larger number of secret key bits can
be extracted. This has been shown theoretically by treating
the NLA as a probabilistic, but noiseless, black box, where
an upper bound on success probability, 1/g2 with g being the
amplification gain, was used [16].
The story can be quite different when we replace the above
ideal NLA with realistic systems that offer NLA-like func-
tionality. For instance, one of the most basic structures for
an NLA is a quantum scissor (QS), which combines the in-
coming light with a single photon [19, 20]. While under weak
signal assumptions, a QS can be approximated as an NLA,
more precise analysis reveals that its operation is not nec-
essarily noiseless. This is particularly important because in
many CV QKD protocols the transmitted signal does not have
a fixed intensity, and realistic NLAs often treat different input
signals differently. This is more or less true for other propos-
als that implement the NLA operation [21–26].
In this paper, we provide a realistic account of what a QS
can offer within a CV QKD setup. In particular, using an ex-
act model for the QS setup, we analyze the secret key rate of a
Gaussian modulated protocol, whose receiver unit is equipped
with a QS. One of the implications of our exact modeling for
the QS is that we cannot directly apply standard key rate cal-
culation techniques that rely on the Gaussianity of the out-
put states. This will make the exact calculation of the key
rate cumbersome. We manage this problem by using relevant
bounds for certain components of the key rate. We investigate
the extent at which the use of quantum scissors can increase
the security distance in CV QKD systems.
One of our key incentives for carrying out the above anal-
ysis is to provide insights into the applicability of other pro-
posals for CV quantum repeaters [27–29] for QKD operation.
The QS-equipped CV QKD link that we consider here con-
tains the elementary repeater (error correction) link used in the
repeater setup of Ref. [27], and as such a poor performance
for this basic building block could cast shadow on the useful-
ness of any larger quantum repeater setup that relies on such
elementary links. In the repeater setup of [27], CV teleporta-
tion is used to swap entanglement between already entangled
links, represented by QM1-QM2 and QM3-QM4 in Fig. 1.
Each of such links have been entangled by sending one half
of a two-mode squeezed vacuum state, represented by EPR
boxes, through a lossy channel. The received signal will then
be amplified, in a probabilistic way, by the QS module, and
will be stored in the corresponding quantum memory (QM).
Note that, considering the non-deterministic behavior of the
QS, use of QM modules is necessary if we want to achieve
any rate enhancement from our repeater setup. The dual ho-
modyne module will then effectively perform entanglement
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FIG. 1. A two-leg quantum repeater module as proposed in Ref. [27].
Each leg is composed of an EPR source generating two-mode
squeezed vacuum states, a quantum scissor (QS), and two quantum
memory (QM) units. Beam splitters with transmissivity T character-
ize the loss in each leg, with excess noise represented by ε. Upon
successful operation of the QS in each leg, the output of the QS and
the EPR source are stored in respective quantum memories. When
both legs are ready, a joint dual homodyne (Dual Hom) measurement
is performed on the quantum states stored in QM2 and QM3, which
swaps entanglement to QM1 and QM4.
swapping in the CV domain once both links have had suc-
cessful QS operations.
Note that the above repeater setup must use a physical
QS implementation, and not a virtual one, in order to of-
fer any rate advantage. That is, the class of measurement-
based NLA (MB-NLA) implementations [30–32], which rely
on data post-selection, would not be suitable for such CV
repeaters. Due to reliance of MB-NLAs on classical post-
selection, the state of QM2 and QM4 must effectively be mea-
sured before the entanglement swapping can be done. Even if
we do not consider the applications of our considered setup
in CV repeater settings, one must be cautious with typically
poor success probability of MB-NLAs compared to that of
physical NLAs [33]. This suggests that the use of physical
NLAs in CV QKD systems is still of interest, and, in fact, one
may favour a physical realization of an NLA over its virtual
post-measurement implementation due to restrictions on the
MB-NLA [34]. Our work here would shed more light into
the applicability of such physical realizations by offering an
accurate analysis of the underlying system.
The manuscript is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we de-
scribe details of the proposed system. In Sec. III, by analyz-
ing input-output characteristic functions of a single QS, we
calculate the exact output state and success probability of the
QS NLA in Ref. [20]. We also study the non-Gaussian behav-
ior of this system. In Sec. IV, we present the key rate analysis
of the CV QKD link with a single QS as part of its receiver.
In Sec. V, we discuss the numerical results. Finally, Sec. VI
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe our proposed setup for the QS-
amplified CV QKD protocol. We assume that the sender, Al-
ice (A), is connected to the receiver, Bob (B), via a quan-
tum channel; see Fig. 2(a). The protocol runs along the same
lines as proposed by Grosshans and Grangier in 2002 (GG02)
[6, 7, 35, 36]. That is, in every round, Alice transmits a co-
herent state |α〉 to Bob, where α = xA + ipA, with real pa-
rameters xA and pA being chosen randomly according to the
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FIG. 2. (a) Schematic view of CV QKD link with an additional quan-
tum scissor at the receiver. (b) Entanglement-based CV QKD proto-
col equivalent to (a). Hom and Het represent, respectively, the ho-
modyne detection and heterodyne detection modules.
following Gaussian probability density functions:
fXA(xA) =
e
− x
2
A
VA/2√
piVA/2
and fPA(pA) =
e
− p
2
A
VA/2√
piVA/2
, (1)
where VA is the modulation variance in the shot-noise units.
At the receiver, however, we equip Bob with a single QS be-
fore the homodyne module used in GG02. Upon a success-
ful QS operation, Bob randomly chooses to measure xˆB =
aˆB + aˆ
†
B or pˆB = (aˆB − aˆ†B)/i, where aˆB represents the
annihilation operator for the output mode of the QS. During
the sifting stage, Bob would then publicly declare his mea-
surement choices as well as the rounds in which the QS has
been successful. Alternatively, one can use the equivalent
entanglement-based (EB) scheme of Fig. 2(b), where Alice’s
source is replaced with an EPR source followed by heterodyne
detection on one of the two modes of the state (by EPR source
we mean a two-mode squeezed vacuum state [9]). In either
case, we assume that Bob can reconstruct, in an error-free
way, the phase reference for the local oscillator used in his
homodyne detection. By using post-processing techniques,
Alice and Bob extract a key from the subset of data for which
the QS has been successful.
Quantum scissors are the main building blocks in the NLA
proposed by Ralph and Lund [20]. At the core of a QS,
there is a partial Bell-state measurement (BSM) module, with
a balanced beam splitter followed by two single-photon de-
tectors, in the space spanned by number states |0〉 and |1〉.
This BSM module is driven by an asymmetric entangled state
|ψ〉 = √µ |1〉cˆ|0〉bˆ3 +
√
1− µ |0〉cˆ|1〉bˆ3 , generated by a single
photon that goes through a beam splitter with transmittance µ;
see Fig. 3. For an input state in the |0〉-|1〉 space, the QS could
then offer an asymmetric teleportation functionality, whenever
the BSM operation is successful, i.e., when only one of D1 or
D2 detector in Fig. 3 clicks. For instance, in the particular case
of a weak coherent state input |α〉aˆ1 ≈ |0〉aˆ1 + α|1〉aˆ1 , with
|α|  1, a single click could come from the single-photon
component in the entangled state |ψ〉 and/or the input state.
In that case, the output state, after renormalization, can be ap-
proximated by |0〉bˆ3 +αg|1〉bˆ3 ≈ |αg〉bˆ3 , for |gα|  1, where
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FIG. 3. The schematic diagram of a quantum scissor. Here, we as-
sume that an on-demand ideal single-photon source (SPS) is in use,
and that the single-photon detectors have unity efficiencies.
g =
√
(1− µ)/µ represents the amplification gain of the QS.
Under these assumptions, the success probability for the QS
operation is given by PRLsucc(α) ≈ µ+ (1− µ)|α|2. Note that,
in the above description, the essential assumption for a QS to
possibly operate as an NLA is that |α|  1.
There are two reservations in using the above asymptotic
approach for analyzing a QS-based CV QKD system. First,
note that the output state of a QS is always in the space
spanned by single-photon and vacuum states. By approxi-
mating the output state as a coherent state, we are introduc-
ing some errors, which can affect the security of the system.
More precisely, the transition from a coherent state to a single-
photon state is a non-Gaussian one, whose effect must be care-
fully considered in the security analysis. Secondly, in the
GG02 protocol, the coherent states are chosen randomly via
Gaussian distributions; hence, the input states to the QS may
not necessarily satisfy the assumption |α|  1.
In order to resolve the above issues, in our work, we find
the exact output state and probability of success for an arbi-
trary coherent state at the input of a QS. This will be detailed
in Sec. III. We note that one can implement a QS/NLA which
truncates input states to first N Fock states [37, 38]. Here
we limit ourselves to the single-photon truncation. We then
apply our findings to the key rate analysis of a QS-equipped
CV QKD system. For simplicity, we assume that the required
single-photon source (SPS) in the QS is ideal and on-demand.
Single-photon detector efficiencies are also assumed to be
unity. Our analysis can, nevertheless, be extended to account
for the imperfections in the source and detectors.
III. QUANTUM SCISSORS: INPUT-OUTPUT
RELATIONSHIP
In this section, we first obtain an exact input-output rela-
tionship for a QS driven by a coherent state. We use charac-
teristic functions to model the input and output states. For a
joint, M -mode, state ρˆ, where each mode j is represented by
an annihilation operator aˆj , the antinormally-ordered charac-
teristic function is given by
χρˆA(ξ1, . . . , ξM ) =
〈 M⊗
j=1
DˆA(aˆj , ξj)
〉
ρˆ
, (2)
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FIG. 4. The quantum channel and the QS are considered as a com-
bined system with input modes aˆ1 − aˆ3 and aˆN and output modes
bˆ1 − bˆ3 and bˆN. The transformation matrix of the system is given by
(4).
where 〈◦〉ρˆ ≡ tr[ρˆ◦] and DˆA(aˆ, ξ) = e−ξ∗aˆeξaˆ† is the
antinormally-ordered displacement operator with ξ∗ being the
complex conjugate of the complex number ξ = ξr + iξi,
with ξr and ξi are real numbers. The density matrix ρˆ and
its antinormally-ordered characteristic function are connected
via a Fourier-transform as follows
ρˆ =
∫
d2ξ1
pi
· · ·
∫
d2ξM
pi
χρˆA(ξ1, . . . , ξM )
M⊗
j=1
DˆN(bˆj , ξj),
(3)
where DˆN(aˆ, ξ) = eξaˆ
†
e−ξ
∗aˆ is the normally-ordered dis-
placement operator and
∫
d2ξ =
∫ +∞
−∞ dξr
∫ +∞
−∞ dξi.
In the following, we use the above formulation to analyze
the setup in Fig. 4, which includes a QS driven by an arbitrary
coherent state through a lossy channel with transmissivity T
and excess noise ε.
A. Pre-measurement state
For the setup in Fig. 4, we can use the well-known rela-
tionships for beam splitters to relate the four input modes to
the four output modes. The dashed box Γ is a linear optics
circuit, for which such input-output relationships can be ob-
tained. In particular, considering the input modes represented
byAT = [aˆ1 aˆ2 aˆ3 aˆN] and output modes BT = [bˆ1 bˆ2 bˆ3 bˆN],
we find B = ΓA, where the transformation matrix
Γ =

√
T
2
√
µ
2 −
√
1−µ
2
√
1−T
2
−
√
T
2
√
µ
2 −
√
1−µ
2 −
√
1−T
2
0
√
1− µ √µ 0
−√1− T 0 0 √T
 (4)
is a unitary orthogonal matrix, i.e., ΓT = Γ−1. The output
antinormally-ordered characteristic function can then be ex-
4pressed in terms of the input one by
χoutA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξN) =
〈 3∏
m=1
DˆA(bˆm, ξm)DˆA(bˆN, ξN)
〉
=
〈 3∏
m=1
DˆA(aˆm, λm)DˆA(aˆN, λN)
〉
=χinA (λ1, λ2, λ3, λN), (5)
where [λ1 λ2 λ3 λN]T = ΓT[ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξN]T, with
ΓT being the transpose of Γ. Here, we make use of
the fact that DˆA(saˆ, ξ) = DˆA(aˆ, sξ), s ∈ R, and
〈DˆA(aˆ, ξ1)DˆA(aˆ, ξ2)〉 = eξ1ξ∗2 〈DˆA(aˆ, ξ1 + ξ2)〉.
Next, we consider the particular input state
ρˆin =|α〉aˆ1〈α| ⊗ |1〉aˆ2〈1| ⊗ |0〉aˆ3〈0|
⊗
∫
d2βfε(β)|β〉aˆN〈β|, (6)
where fε(β) = e
− |β|
2
ε/2
piε/2 , with ε being the channel excess noise.
This corresponds to a Gaussian attack by Eve, which we later
use in forthcoming sections. For the above set of input states,
the output characteristic function has the following expression
χoutA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξN) =tr
[
ρˆinDˆA(aˆ1, λ1)DˆA(aˆ2, λ2)
DˆA(aˆ3, λ3)DˆA(aˆN, λN)
]
. (7)
By using the transformation matrix Γ, this can be re-written
as the following
χoutA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3,ξN) = e
−T2 |ξ1−ξ2−
√
2 τξN|2
× e
√
2T iIm[α¯(ξ1−ξ2−
√
2 τξN)]
× e− 1−T2 (1+ ε2 )|ξ1−ξ2+
√
2
τ ξN|2
× e− 1−µ2 |ξ1+ξ2−
√
2
g ξ3|2e−
µ
2 |ξ1+ξ2+
√
2 gξ3|2
×
(
1− µ
2
|ξ1 + ξ2 +
√
2 gξ3|2
)
, (8)
where g =
√
(1− µ)/µ , τ = √(1− T )/T , and Im[ξ] being
the imaginary part of complex number ξ. Using Eq. (3), the
joint state of the output modes is then given by
ρˆB =
∫
d2ξ1
pi
∫
d2ξ2
pi
∫
d2ξ3
pi
∫
d2ξN
pi
χoutA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξN)
DˆN(bˆ1, ξ1)DˆN(bˆ2, ξ2)DˆN(bˆ3, ξ3)DˆN(bˆN, ξN). (9)
We can next trace out mode bˆN to obtain the joint state of
[bˆ1 bˆ2 bˆ3], which is
ρˆout =
∫
d2ξ1
pi
∫
d2ξ2
pi
∫
d2ξ3
pi
χoutA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, 0)
DˆN(bˆ1, ξ1)DˆN(bˆ2, ξ2)DˆN(bˆ3, ξ3), (10)
where
χoutA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, 0) =e
−F1|ξ1−ξ2|2e
√
2T iIm[α¯(ξ1−ξ2)]
× e−µ2 |ξ1+ξ2+
√
2 gξ3|2e−
1−µ
2 |ξ1+ξ2−
√
2
g ξ3|2
× (1− µ
2
|ξ1 + ξ2 +
√
2 gξ3|2
)
, (11)
with F1 = 12 +
1
4 (1 − T )ε. Note that εrec = (1 − T )ε is
the amount of excess noise at the receiver side; thus, F1 =
1
2 +
1
4Tεtm, where εtm = εrec/T is the amount of excess
noise at the transmitter.
B. Post-selected state
Following Ref. [20], we consider a QS to be successful if
only one detector in Fig. 4 clicks. In order to model such mea-
surements we use the following non-resolving measurement
operator
Mˆ = (1− |0〉1〈0|)⊗ |0〉2〈0|, (12)
which corresponds to the case where detector D1 clicks while
D2 does not. The post-selected state, ρˆPSout, is then given by
[39]:
ρˆPSout =
trbˆ1bˆ2(ρˆoutMˆ)
tr(ρˆoutMˆ)
=
1
PPS
∫
d2ξ1
pi
∫
d2ξ2
pi
∫
d2ξ3
pi
χoutA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, 0)
× (piδ2(ξ1)− 1)DˆN(bˆ3, ξ3), (13)
where δ2(ξ) = δ(ξr)δ(ξi) and PPS = tr(Mˆρˆout) is the corre-
sponding (success) probability of the measurement Mˆ , which
will be calculated in Sec. III C.
Because the truncated post-measurement state lives in the
qubit subspace spanned by number states {|0〉bˆ3 , |1〉bˆ3}, the
output state has the form
ρˆPSout(α) =ρ00(α)|0〉bˆ3〈0|+ ρ01(α)|0〉bˆ3〈1|
+ ρ10(α)|1〉bˆ3〈0|+ ρ11(α)|1〉bˆ3〈1|, (14)
where ρjk(α) = bˆ3〈j|ρˆPSout(α)|k〉bˆ3 , for j, k = 0, 1. We then
obtain
ρ00(α) =
2[2F1(2F1+1)+T |α|2]
(g2+1)(2F1+1)3
e−T
|α|2
2F1+1 /PPS(α)
ρ01(α) =
−2g√T α
(g2+1)(2F1+1)2
e−T
|α|2
2F1+1 /PPS(α) = ρ∗10(α)
ρ11(α) =
2g2
g2+1
(
e
−T |α|
2
2F1+1
2F1+1
− e
−T |α|
2
2F1
4F1
)
/PPS(α).
(15)
We remark that in the case that only detector D2 clicks,
the QS is still considered successful. After working out the
post-selected output state, we find that the result has the same
form as in Eq. (14), but we only need to replace α with −α in
5Eq. (15). In practice, in a QKD setup, Bob can negate its mea-
surement results whenever this happens. One can also use a
unitary operation to correct the output state so that we always
end up with Eq. (14) as the post-selected state.
We note that the post-measurement state is Hermitian and
positive-semidefinite, as expected. In addition, in the limit of
|gα|  1, we can verify that the post-selected state of the
single QS approaches the weak coherent state |gα〉.
C. Probability of success
The probability of success for measurement Mˆ and input
|α〉 is given by
PPS(α) =tr(ρˆoutMˆ)
=
∫
d2ξ1
pi
∫
d2ξ2
pi
χoutA (ξ1, ξ2, 0, 0)(piδ
2(ξ1)− 1).
(16)
By substituting Eq. (8) into the above expression, we obtain
Psucc(α) =2P
PS(α)
=
4
(
g2(2F1 + 1)
2 + 2F1(2F1 + 1) + T |α|2
)
(g2 + 1)(2F1 + 1)3
× e−T |α|
2
2F1+1 − g
2
(g2 + 1)F1
e−T
|α|2
2F1 , (17)
where Psucc(α) is the total probability of success for the QS
module, i.e., when either of D1 or D2 detector clicks. As
expected, Psucc(α) approaches, to first-order approximation,
to PRLsucc(α) = µ+ (1−µ)|α|2 = (1 + |gα|2)/(1 + g2), when
|α|  1, at ε = 0 and T = 1.
This approximation is, however, invalid even when we
slightly deviate from the condition on |α|, as can be seen in
Fig. 5(a). Here, we have plotted the exact probability of suc-
cess, Psucc(α), versus |α|2 and g, and compared it with the
asymptotic value obtained by Ralph and Lund, PRLsucc(α). It
can be seen that the exact probability of success is always
lower than the asymptotic value, and the difference is visi-
ble at all values of g. The success probability also increases
with the decrease in g. For |α|  1, the success probability
approaches its maximum possible value of 1/g2 [18]. But,
again, as can be seen in Fig. 5(b), we quickly deviate from
this ideal regime when |α| increases. This indicates that we
cannot operate at maximum possible success probability for
all possible inputs, as assumed in Ref. [16], if we use a QS as
an NLA.
In Fig. 5(b), the maximum possible success probability,
1/g2, divides the plot into two regions. There is a region in
which the success probability is above the maximum possi-
ble for an NLA. This implies that the QS operation should be
very noisy in this region, hence breaking the assumption on
the noise-free operation of the NLA. If we want to work in the
region that Psucc(α) < 1/g2, we will then have to deal with
limitations on the maximum gain that we can choose for the
range of input states we may expect. This indicates a trade-
off between the amount of noise that the QS may add to the
FIG. 5. (a) The exact success probability of a single QS (lower red),
Psucc, and that based on approximations in Ref. [20] (upper blue),
PRLsucc. (b) The exact success probability of a single QS (red), Psucc,
and that of an ideal NLA (grey), upper bounded by 1/g2, versus
average photon number and amplification gain. In all cases, ε = 0
and T = 1.
signal versus its gain and success probability. We will later
address this issue, in the context of CV QKD, in our numer-
ical results when we optimize the secret key generation rate
over the system parameters.
D. Non-Gaussian behavior of the QS
Before calculating the secret key generation rate of a QS-
equipped CV QKD system, it is necessary to better understand
the nature of a quantum channel that includes a QS module.
This is important because the majority of results on the secret
key rate of CV QKD systems rely on Gaussian characteristics
of the channel [35, 40]. This is not, however, the case for a
QS module as we see in this section.
In order to examine the non-Gaussian behavior of the QS
output, let us focus on the distribution of homodyne measure-
ment results on quadrature xˆB . Let us also consider an in-
put coherent state |α〉, with α = xA + ipA as distributed by
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FIG. 6. The output distribution at the receiver side (solid-black),
which comprises Gaussian (dashed blue) and non-Gaussian (dot-
dashed red) parts. Here, g = 2, VA = 0.05, ε = 0, and T = 1.
Eq. (1), at the QS port aˆ1. That results in a thermal state with
variance VA and given by
∫
d2α e
− |α|
2
VA/2
piVA/2
|α〉aˆ1〈α|. After per-
forming similar calculations, the post-selected state will be
given by
σˆPSout(VA) =σ00(VA)|0〉bˆ3〈0|+ σ11(VA)|1〉bˆ3〈1|, (18)
where{
σ00(VA) =
8F2
(g2+1)(2F2+1)2Psucc(VA)
σ11(VA) =
4g2
(g2+1)Psucc(VA)
(
1
2F2+1
− 14F2
) (19)
with success probability
Psucc(VA) =
4
(g2 + 1)
(g2(2F2 + 1) + 2F2
(2F2 + 1)2
− g
2
4F2
)
(20)
and F2 = 12 +
1
4T (VA + εtm).
The probability distribution for obtaining a real number xB
after measuring xˆB , conditional on the success of the QS, is
then given by
fXB (xB) = tr(σˆ
PS
out(VA)|xB〉〈xB |)
=
(
σ00(VA) + 2σ11(VA)x
2
B
)e−x2B√
pi
, (21)
where xˆB |xB〉 = xB |xB〉.
The expression for fXB (xB) will then have two compo-
nents: one is a Gaussian term in xB proportional to σ00(VA),
and the other is a non-Gaussian term proportional to σ11(VA).
Figure 6 shows the contribution of each of these components
in making fXB (xB) at g = 2, VA = 0.05, ε = 0, and T = 1.
We notice that even for such a small modulation variance,
which corresponds mostly to small values of |α|, the non-
Gaussian term is quite distinct. Higher amplification gains
could even result in more deviation from a Gaussian state.
This non-Gaussian behavior would have ramifications on the
key rate analysis of a QS-based system as we see next.
IV. SECRET KEY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we use the results in Sec. III to determine the
secret key rate of the GG02 protocol when Bob uses a single
QS before his homodyne measurement. We find the secret key
rate in a nominal operation condition when no eavesdropper
is present. We, however, assume a thermal loss channel with
trasmissivity T , modeled by a beam splitter, and an excess
noise ε. This can effectively be thought as having an eaves-
dropper who attempts a Gaussian attack [41]. Such an attack
may not be the optimal one for our non-Gaussian channel, but
considering how close the output distribution in Fig. 6 is to a
Gaussian distribution, the results obtained for this particular
channel should not be far away from that obtained in an opti-
mal attack [42]. The secret key rate of CV QKD protocols in
the asymptotic limit of infinitely many signals is given by
K = βI
AB
− χ
BE
, (22)
where β, I
AB
, χ
BE
are, respectively, the reconciliation effi-
ciency, the mutual information between Alice and Bob, and
eavesdropper’s accessible information when reverse reconcil-
iation is used.
In our proposed setup, since the QS operation is non-
deterministic, the whole key rate formula should be multiplied
by the average success probability of the QS, P succ, where the
averaging is performed over all possible inputs. Therefore, the
secret key rate reads
KQS ≥ P succ(βI?AB − χ?BE), (23)
where ‘?’ indicates that the mutual and Holevo information
terms are calculated for the post-selected data when the QS is
successful. The measurement results corresponding to unsuc-
cessful QS events will be discarded at the sifting stage.
The fact that we only use the post-selected data for key
extraction implies that we have to account for the non-
Gaussianity of the QS output states. Unfortunately, the non-
Gaussian behavior of the QS makes conventional methods for
key rate calculation inapplicable. In order to take the non-
Gaussian effects into account, we calculate the exact mutual
information by directly using the conditional distribution of
the QS output. Ideally one could also look for the exact calcu-
lation of the Holevo information term as well. But, this turns
out to be extremely cumbersome. Instead, in this paper, we
find an upper bound for the Holevo information term by find-
ing the covariance matrix (CM) of the output state from the
total channel and then calculate the Holevo information for a
Gaussian state with the same CM. The reason is that Gaus-
sian collective attacks are proven to be optimal in the sense
that they maximize the Holevo quantity [40] of fixed CM for
the output shared state. Given the generality of the results in
[40], in a real experiment, once we obtain the CM terms from
the measurement results, we can use the same methodology to
obtain a lower bound on the key rate.
In the following, we provide more detail on how each of the
terms in Eq. (23) can be calculated.
7A. Mutual information
The mutual information between two random variables XA
and XB , corresponding to post-selected data on Alice’s and
Bob’s sides, is the difference between the entropy function
H(XB) and the conditional entropy H(XB |XA) [43]:
I?
AB
= H(XB)−H(XB |XA), (24)
where
H(XB) = −
∫
dxB fXB (xB) log2 fXB (xB), (25)
and
H(XB |XA) =−
∫ ∫
dxAdxBf(xA, xB) log2 fXB (xB |xA),
(26)
with f(xA, xB) = fXA(xA)fXB (xB |xA) being the joint
probability density function.
Here, fXB (xB) can be obtained by using Eq. (21), while
the conditional output distribution fXB (xB |xA) can be ob-
tained as follows:
fXB (xB |xA) = tr(ωˆPSout(xA)|xB〉〈xB |), (27)
where the conditional output state ωˆPSout(xA) is calculated in
Appendix. A. In our work, we numerically carry out the above
integrals for a given set of parameters.
B. Holevo information
In order to calculate the Holevo information term, χ?
BE
, we
use the EB description of the protocol, where one part of an
EPR state travels through the quantum channel and amplified
by a QS, while the other is measured by Alice; see Fig. 7. In
order to upper bound χ?
BE
, what we need is then the CM of
Alice-Bob bipartite state. We will then first derive the exact
post-selected joint state, from which the CM parameters can
be obtained. We use a similar approach to Sec. III in using
characteristic functions to find a relationship between Alice
and Bob states when the QS is successful. As shown in Fig. 7,
we also account for the effect of the quantum channel loss and
excess noise in our calculations.
By using Eq. (2) and the transformation matrix Γ, we can
now write the full output antinormally-ordered characteristic
function, including aˆ0 mode, in terms of the input one by
χoutA (ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξN) = χ
in
A (λ0, λ1, λ2, λ3, λN), where
[λ0 λ1 λ2 λ3 λN]
T =
(
1 0
0 ΓT
)
[ξ0 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξN]
T ,
with χinA (λ0, λ1, λ2, λ3, λN) = χ
EPR
A (λ0, λ1) ×
χinA (λ2, λ3, λN), where χ
EPR
A (λ0, λ1) = exp{−δ2(|λ0|2 +
|λ1|2) − 2Re(δγλ∗0λ∗1)} is the antinormally-ordered char-
acteristic function of the EPR state with parameters δ and
γ =
√
δ2 − 1 , and Re[ξ] being the real part of the complex
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FIG. 7. QS-amplified EB CV QKD scheme. The quantum channel
and the QS are considered as a combined system with input modes
aˆ1−aˆ3 and aˆN and output modes bˆ1− bˆ3 and bˆN. The transformation
matrix of the system is given by Eq. (4).
number ξ. The term χinA (λ2, λ3, λN) is calculated for input
state |1〉aˆ2〈1| ⊗ |0〉aˆ3〈0| ⊗
∫
d2βfε(β)|β〉aˆN〈β|.
Putting all this together, we then find the pre-measurement
antinormally-ordered characteristic function for modes aˆ0, bˆ1,
bˆ2, bˆ3, and bˆN as follows:
χoutA (ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξN) = e
−δ2|ξ0|2e−κRe
(
ξ∗0 (ξ
∗
1−ξ∗2 )
)
× e− δ
2T
2 |ξ1−ξ2−
√
2 τξN|2e−
1−T
2 (1+
ε
2 )|ξ1−ξ2+
√
2
τ ξN|2
× e− 1−µ2 |ξ1+ξ2−
√
2
g ξ3|2e−
µ
2 |ξ1+ξ2+
√
2 gξ3|2
×
(
1− µ
2
|ξ1 + ξ2 +
√
2 gξ3|2
)
, (28)
where κ = 2δγ
√
T/2 .
In the EB scheme, we find the corresponding parameter δ
in our EPR state, which gives the same output statistics for
the signal that goes to Bob, when Alice does a heterodyne
measurement on her state. It then turns out that to get an iden-
tical output state we should satisfy δ =
√
(V + 1)/2 , where
V = VA + 1.
Having obtained the output characteristic function, we can
find the corresponding output density matrix using Eq. (3).
Then, by tracing out the output mode bˆN and also performing
photon-detection measurements on modes bˆ1 and bˆ2—by in-
troducing the same measurement operator as in Eq. (12)—we
find the resultant joint state of aˆ0 and bˆ3 modes in the case of
having a successful event.
Appendix B provides the detailed calculations of the post-
measurement density matrix, and the corresponding CM pa-
rameters. It turns out that the CM of the shared bipartite state
between Alice and Bob has the form
γAB =
(
a1 cσz
cσz b1
)
, (29)
where 1 = diag(1, 1) and σz = diag(1,−1) with
8a =
δ2
(g2 + 1)P succ
(8[γ2T + (2F3 + 1− γ2T )(g2(2F3 + 1) + 2F3)]
(2F3 + 1)3
− g
2(2F3 − γ2T )
F 23
)
− 1,
b =
4
(g2 + 1)P succ
(4[g2(2F3 + 1) + F3]
(2F3 + 1)2
− g
2
F
)
− 1,
c =
8δγ
(g2 + 1)P succ(2F3 + 1)2
g
√
T , (30)
F3 =
1
2
+
1
4
T
(
2(δ2 − 1) + εtm
)
and P succ =
1
g2 + 1
(4[(2F3 + 1)g2 + 2F3]
(2F3 + 1)2
− g
2
F3
)
.
It is interesting to make the following observation. If the
EPR state is assumed totally uncorrelated, which happens
when its squeezing parameter goes to zero, both parts of the
state are left with vacuum states. Thus, if the QS is successful,
the output state of mode bˆ3 should be a vacuum state as well.
This means that the CM of the end-to-end state is the identity
[9]. We verify that in the case of having a totally uncorrelated
EPR state, corresponding to δ = 1 and γ = 0, the expres-
sions above will indeed result in the identity matrix; that is,
we obtain a = b = 1 and c = 0.
In addition, as a result of the statistical equivalence between
EB and PM schemes, where δ =
√
(V + 1)/2 , we conclude
that F3 = F2. Now that the CM is known, we can upper
bound the Holevo information by using Eq. (B13).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical simulations of the se-
cret key rate of the QS-amplified GG02 protocol and compare
it with that of the conventional one. We find the maximum
value for the lower bound in Eq. (23) by optimizing, at each
distance, the modulation variance, VA, or, equivalently, the
parameter δ in the EB scenario, as well as the QS parameter,
µ, which specifies the QS amplification gain. We also ac-
count for the excess noise, as discussed in previous sections.
We assume that the quantum channel between the sender and
receiver is an optical fiber with loss factor α, whose trans-
mittance is given by T = 10−αL/10, where L is the channel
length and the loss factor is α = 0.2 dB/km corresponding to
standard optical fibers. Also, we assume β = 1 and that ideal
homodyne detection, with no electronic noise, is performed at
the receiver.
We first highlight the importance of accounting for the non-
Gaussian behavior of the QS by comparing the difference be-
tween the exact value of the mutual information function I?
AB
,
given by Eq. (24), and that obtained by Gaussian approxima-
tion, IG
AB
, in Eq. (B14). Figure 8 shows both curves, versus
distance, at no excess noise. It is clear that the Gaussian ap-
proximation would have overestimated the mutual informa-
tion between Alice and Bob at all distances considered, and
that could have resulted in wrong bounds for the key rate of
QS-based systems.
Figure 9 shows the optimized secret key rates of both
conventional (solid lines) and the QS-assisted (dashed lines)
GG02 protocol versus distance, as well as that of the PLOB
bound for a repeaterless thermal-loss channel (labelled TL-
PLOB) [44].This is the bound given in Eq. (23) of Ref.
[44] at an equivalent mean thermal photon number, n¯ =
εtmT/(2(1− T )), to our receiver excess noise (here at εtm =
0.05) [45]. There are several interesting observations that
can be made in this figure. First, we note that for all con-
sidered cases, there exists a cross-over distance at which the
QS-assisted curves surpass their corresponding no-QS curves.
At εtm = 0, this happens at around 200 km. By increasing
εtm, the cross-over distance would drop and reaches around
150 km at εtm = 0.05. This proves the key objective of our
work that, by using realistic NLAs, there would be certain
regimes where NLA-based systems improve the performance
and the distance at which secure keys can be exchanged.
It can be seen, in Fig. 9, that QS-equipped receivers may
not support high key rates at short distances. In fact, except
for the case of εtm = 0, we may not be able to exchange
any secret keys at very short distances for the QS-based sys-
tem. Even for the no excess noise case, there are over two
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orders of magnitude difference between the no-QS and QS-
based curves at L = 0. This is attributed to multiple factors.
First, the trade-off between the choice of modulation variance
and noise level in the system, would require us to use very
small values of VA at short distances, otherwise the QS will
not operate at its low-noise regime. For instance, at L = 0,
the optimum value of VA for the QS-based system is 0.04. A
no-QS system with such a low value of VA also offers a low
key rate of 2.83× 10−2, which is comparable to what we ob-
tain for the QS-based system. Another factor is the success
probability that at L = 0 is around 0.5, and it almost linearly
goes down to around 0.15 at 200 km. One last factor is also
the fact that the QS is not entirely noise free. The additional
noise by the QS would further decrese the rate at L = 0. In
addition to this, if we have nonzero values of excess noise, a
combination of the above effects plus the external noise drive
the key rate to zero at very short distances. This is by itself is
not a practical dilemma, as, for a given channel length, one, in
advance, can figure out whether to use a QS or not. But, this
can affect the applicability of QS modules in a CV quantum
repeater system.
Another observation in Fig. 9 is that, at long distances, the
TABLE I. Optimized values for modulation variance and amplifica-
tion gain at zero excess noise for the QS-based system.
Distance (km) Optimized VA Optimized gain, g
0 0.05 1.00
100 0.8 1.36
200 3.5 2.38
300 11.5 4.36
400 12.5 14.1
500 13.5 100
key rate for QS-based systems follows a parallel trend to that
of the TL-PLOB curve. For instance, at εtm = 0.05, the key
rate remains roughly one order of magnitude below the PLOB
bound for long distances. We have numerically verified that,
by optimizing system parameters, even for longer distances
than shown on the graph, we can obtain positive key rates,
albeit very low, for QS-assisted systems. The post-selection
mechanism in the QS seems to be the key to obtaining positive
key rates at long distances. At such distances, the channel
loss naturally prepares low-intensity inputs to the QS, which
allows us to use larger values of VA, as shown in Table I. That
would also enable us to use higher gains without necessarily
increasing the QS noise. A higher-than unity gain for the post-
selected states would then offer a better signal-to-noise ratio
at long distances, which allows us to achieve positive secret
key rates at longer distances than can otherwise be achieved
for a no-QS system.
Figure 9 also shows that our QS-amplified system cannot
beat the existing upper bound for repeaterless systems [44].
This agrees with the fact that any postprocessing at the re-
ceiver side does not change the repeaterless nature of the link,
even though a form of amplification is in use. But, it will be
interesting to see if, based on the above results, we can as-
sess the practicality of the proposed CV repeater setups as in
Ref. [27]. On the positive side, we can see that there exists a
regime of operation where the slope of the QS-based curves
offer a square root advantage as needed in repeater systems.
On the downside, however, this behaviour only appears in a
limited range of distance, and only up to a maximum value of
excess noise. In our simulations, we were not able to obtain
any positive secret key rates at εtm = 0.06, or higher. It seems
that once the starting distance at which QS-based curves offer
positive key rates lie above the maximum security distance for
no-QS systems, it is no longer possible to get a positive key
rate for QS-assisted systems. This may suggest that similar
limitations might affect the suitability of CV repeater systems
for QKD applications, which needs further investigation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this work, we studied the performance of the GG02 pro-
tocol where the received signal was amplified by a quantum
scissor. We first obtained the exact output state and success
probability of the QS under study, which was later used in
calculating the secret key generation rate of the system. We
showed that the QS would turn a Gaussian input state into a
non-Gaussian one. That would make the conventional tech-
niques to estimating the key rate not directly applicable to
our case. We instead directly calculated the mutual informa-
tion by working out the probability distribution function of the
quadratures after the QS. Also, in order to calculate the leaked
information to Eve, we obtained the exact covariance matrix
of the bipartite state shared between sender and receiver labs
in the particular case of a Gaussian attack. We then found
the Holevo information corresponding to a Gaussian shared
output state with the same covariance matrix, which gives an
upper bound for the Holevo term in the case considered. We
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optimized the key rate over input modulation variance and am-
plification gain. Our results showed that, for a certain range
of excess noise, the QS-enhanced system could reach longer
distances than the no-QS system.
There are certain practical aspects that one should consider
before using quantum scissors in CV QKD. One assumption
that we make throughout our paper is that on-demand single-
photon sources are available for our scheme. There are two
practical issues, in this regard, that affect the performance of
the QS-based system. The first is the rate at which single-
photons are generated. The success rate of such sources di-
rectly affect the key rate achievable. Secondly, we should be
cautious about the purity of the single-photon source output.
Multiple-photon components, in particular, could be damag-
ing to the performance of the QS. The good news is that
the current available technology for quantum-dot sources has
made a substantial progress to meet both above requirements.
In particular, quantum dot sources with efficiencies over 80%
and second-order coherence values< 0.004 have already been
demonstrated [46, 47]. The second issue is the reliance on
single-photon detectors, which will make CV QKD systems,
in terms of requirements, as pricy as their discrete-variable
counterparts. But, paying such prices may be unavoidable
if one wants to have long-distance CV QKD and/or CV re-
peaters. Our study would, in particular, be highly relevant to
analyzing the performance of recently proposed CV quantum
repeaters [27], which rely on a similar building block. Finally,
note that while the original NLA proposal by Ralph and Lund
relies on multiple QS modules, in our scheme, we find using
one QS is optimal as it minimizes the noise while we can ad-
just the signal level by optimizing the modulation variance.
This also agrees with the results reported in Ref. [29], where
they have shown that the reverse coherent information [48, 49]
is maximum when one QS is used.
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Appendix A: Conditional output state ωˆPSout(xA)
In order to find the conditional output state when Alice has used an X quadrature value of xA, we start with the input state
in Eq. (6), and take an average over PA with the input Gaussian distribution of fPA(pA) = e
− p
2
A
VA/2 /
√
piVA/2 . As a result, the
output characteristic function in Eq. (8) will also be averaged out and result in the following output state:
ωˆPSout(xA) =ω00(xA)|0〉bˆ3〈0|+ ω01(xA)|0〉bˆ3〈1|+ ω10(xA)|1〉bˆ3〈0|+ ω11(xA)|1〉bˆ3〈1|, (A1)
where 
ω00(xA) =
ω˜00(xA)
PPS(xA)
ω01(xA) = ω
∗
10(xA) =
ω˜01(xA)
PPS(xA)
ω11(xA) =
ω˜11(xA)
PPS(xA)
,
(A2)
with 
ω˜00(xA) =
√
2
8F1(2F1+1)
2+TVA(8F
2
1 +6F1+1)+2T (TVA+4F1+2)x
2
A
(g2+1)(2F1+1)5/2(TVA+4F1+2)3/2
e−
Tx2A
2F1+1
ω˜01(xA) = − 2g
√
2T xA
(g2+1)(2F1+1)3/2
√
TVA+4F1+2
e−
Tx2A
2F1+1
ω˜11(xA) =
g2
g2+1
(
2
√
2 e
− Tx
2
A
2F1+1√
(2F1+1)(TVA+4F1+2)
− e
−Tx
2
A
2F1√
F1(TVA+4F1)
)
PPS(xA) = ω˜00(xA) + ω˜11(xA).
(A3)
Appendix B: Covariance matrix elements
Having obtained the output antinormally-ordered characteristic function of Eq. (28), we use Eq. (3) to find the corresponding
output state:
ρˆout0123N =
∫
d2ξ0
pi
d2ξ1
pi
d2ξ2
pi
d2ξ3
pi
d2ξN
pi
χoutA (ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξN)DˆN(aˆ0, ξ0)DˆN(bˆ1, ξ1)DˆN(bˆ2, ξ2)DˆN(bˆ3, ξ3)DˆN(bˆN, ξN). (B1)
11
In the following, we show how the shared state between Alice and Bob is found step-by-step. We first trace out mode bˆN, see
Fig. 7, to obtain
ρˆout0123 =
∫
d2ξ0
pi
d2ξ1
pi
d2ξ2
pi
d2ξ3
pi
χoutA (ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, 0)DˆN(aˆ0, ξ0)DˆN(bˆ1, ξ1)DˆN(bˆ2, ξ2)DˆN(bˆ3, ξ3), (B2)
where we used tr[DˆN(a, ξ)] = piδ2(ξ). Next, by defining the measurement operator Mˆ = (I − |0〉b1〈0|) ⊗ |0〉b2〈0|, modes bˆ1
and bˆ2 are measured. The post-selected state is
ρˆPS03 =
tr12(ρˆ
out
0123Mˆ)
tr(ρˆout0123Mˆ)
=:
σˆPS03
PPSEB
, (B3)
where
σˆPS03 =
∫
d2ξ0
pi
d2ξ3
pi
[∫
d2ξ1
pi
d2ξ2
pi
χoutA (ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, 0)
(
piδ2(ξ1)− 1
)]
DˆN(aˆ0, ξ0)DˆN(bˆ3, ξ3)
=
∫
d2ξ0
pi
d2ξ3
pi
χ˜A(ξ0, ξ3)DˆN(aˆ0, ξ0)DˆN(bˆ3, ξ3) (B4)
with
χ˜A(ξ0, ξ3) =
∫
d2ξ1
pi
d2ξ2
pi
χoutA (ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, 0)
(
piδ2(ξ1)− 1
)
, (B5)
and PPSEB = P succ/2 is the corresponding success probability to measurement Mˆ :
PPSEB =
∫
d2ξ1
pi
d2ξ2
pi
χoutA (0, ξ1, ξ2, 0, 0)
(
piδ2(ξ1)− 1
)
= χ˜A(0, 0). (B6)
Now, we find the CM for ρˆPS03 . In doing so, we need to work out the triplet (a, b, c) of the corresponding CM as follows. By
definition, assuming that xˆ0 is the X quadrature of mode aˆ0, we have
a = 〈xˆ20〉ρˆ03 =
〈xˆ20〉σˆ03
PPSEB
=
tr(σˆ03xˆ
2
0)
PPSEB
, (B7)
where
tr(σˆ03xˆ
2
0) =
∫
d2ξ0
pi
d2ξ3
pi
χ˜A(ξ0, ξ3)× tr[xˆ20DˆN(aˆ0, ξ0)]× tr[DˆN(bˆ3, ξ3)]
=
∫
d2ξ0
pi
χ˜A(ξ0, 0)× tr(DˆN(aˆ0, ξ0)xˆ20). (B8)
Assuming that ξ0 = x+ iy, one can show that tr(DˆN(aˆ0, ξ0)xˆ20) = piδ
2(ξ0) + 2piyδ(x)
d
dy δ(y)− piδ(x) d
2
dy2 δ(y); thus,
tr(σˆ03xˆ
2
0) =− χ˜A(0, 0)−
d2
dy2
χ˜A(0, y, ξ3 = 0)
∣∣∣
y=0
, (B9)
where we use the identity
∫
dzf(z) ddz δ(z) = −
∫
dz ddz f(z)δ(z). Therefore,
a = −1−
d2
dy2 χ˜A(0, y, ξ3 = 0)
∣∣∣
y=0
χ˜A(0, 0)
. (B10)
In a similar way, assuming ξ0 = x+ iy and ξ3 = u+ iv, we show that
b =
tr(σˆ03xˆ
2
3)
χ˜A(0, 0)
= −1−
d2
dv2 χ˜A(ξ0 = 0, 0, v)
∣∣∣
v=0
χ˜A(0, 0)
(B11)
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and
c =
tr(σˆ03xˆ0xˆ3)
χ˜A(0, 0)
=
d
dv
[
d
dy χ˜A(0, y, 0, v)
∣∣∣
y=0
]∣∣∣
v=0
χ˜A(0, 0)
. (B12)
Having the integrals in Eq. (B5) taken, we are able to calculate the triplet (a, b, c), thus the CM. Using MAPLE, we obtain the
closed form expressions as summarized in Eq. (30).
Having the triplet (a, b, c), χ?
BE
is upper bounded by:
χG
BE
= g(Λ1) + g(Λ2)− g(Λ3), (B13)
where
g(x) = (
x+ 1
2
) log2(
x+ 1
2
)− (x− 1
2
) log2(
x− 1
2
)
and
Λ1/2 =
√
1
2
(
A±
√
A2 − 4B2 ) = √(a+ b)2 − 4c2 ± (b− a)
2
, Λ3 =
√
aB
b
=
√
a(ab− c2)
b
,
with A = a2 + b2 − 2c2 and B = ab − c2. Note that Eq. (B13) is valid when we neglect the electronic noise at the receiver as
we have assumed in our numerical results. Also, mutual information can be calculated form the covariance matrix, if we wish to
use the Gaussian approximation, by
IG
AB
=
1
2
log2
ab
ab− c2 . (B14)
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